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Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

yarsk radar sire and rh e development of rh e SS-25 ICBM,
and growing tensions as rhe Cold War heightened.
T he rreary wo uld have provided for an initial overall
limit of 2,400 srraregic nuclear delivery vehicles for each
nation and a limit of 1,300 mulripl e-independendyrarge table-reenrry vehicles (MIRV) carrying ballistic missiles. T he protocol wo uld have bann ed the deployment
of air-to-su rface ballistic missi les (AS BMs) and groundand sea-laun ched cruise missiles (GLCMs and SLCMs)
with ranges in excess of 600 ki lometers, whi le the Joint
Sraremenr of Principles wou ld have provided for subsequent SALT III negoriarions.
SriII , rh e SALT II acco rds were observed by borh the
US R and rhe Uni ted Stares on a vo luntary basis until
May 1986, when President Ronald Reagan annou nced
rh ar the United Stares wou ld no longer be bound by irs
cei lin gs. In rh e meantim e, a new round of arms control
nego tiations had already been initiated by rh e Reagan administration in July 1982 under rhe Strategic Arms Redu ction Talks (START I).
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Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
Anns control talks ( TART I) berween d1e USSR and rhe
United rates d1ar replaced the rraregicArms Limitation
Talk ( ALT). T hese talks were carried our from June
1982 until July 1991 , re ulring in the Treaty Berween me
United tares and th e USSR on the Reduction and Limitat ion of Strategic Offen ive Arms.
The e talks were initial ly conducted by me United
Stares wid1 the goal of red ucing large numbers of Soviet
m ul rip le- independen dy- ra rgerable- reen rry-veh icled
(MIRVed) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
whil e ar d1e same rime keeping intact U.S . submari ne-

launched ballistic mi ss il es (SLBM) and ai r-laun ched.
cruise-miss iles-(ALCM)- ba ed strategic forces. Soviet del.
egares countered d1 ese proposals with their own demands,
whi ch included a total ban on all long-range cruise m~.
siles. These ralks were broken off by rhe USSR in November 1983. They resumed on ly in March 1985, under
rhe bilateral Nuclea r and Space Talks forum, afreran eas.
ing of tensions over U.S. basing of ground-launched
cruise missil es (G LCMs) and Pershing lis in Wesrern Eu.
rope. The START I Treaty was finally reached on july
31 , 1991. The Russ ian Federation, Republic of Belarus
Ukraine, and Kazakhsran-four successor states of th;
former Soviet Union-became parries to this treaty with
rhe sign ing of me Lisbon Protocol in May 1992.
In this rreary an agreed limit of 1,600 "deployed"stra·
regie nucl ear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) and 6,000 "ac·
counrable" warheads (that is, warheads on the SNDYs)
was set. For these warheads, lim irs were set at 4,900 for
deployed ICBMs/SLBMs, 1, 100 for deployed mobile
ICBMs, and 1,540 for deployed heavy ICBMs. Reduc·
rions to rhe agreed upon limi rs were to rake place in three
phases over rhe course of seven years. The rreary itself
would be in force for fifteen years, at me end of which
an option for extension exists.
The first phase of reductions rook place no later than
thirty-six months after treaty entry into force and witnessed a lowering of SNDVs to 2,100 and warheads ro
9,150 (of which only 8,050 could be deployed on
ICBMs/SLBMs). The seco nd phase of reductions wa.s
slated to rake effect no later than sixty months after the
treaty's entry inro force and would acllieve a loweringof
SNDVs to 1,900 and warheads to 7,950 (of which only
6,750 could be deployed on ICBMs/SLBMs). The third
phase of reductions would rake place no later than eighty·
four months after the treaty's entry into force and rep·
resenrs th e target numbers agreed upon in mis accord.
Separate agreemenrs to this treaty limited SLCMs with
ranges above 600 kilometers at 800 for each nation and
lim ited Soviet Backfire bombers to 500.
Three major criticisms of the START I Treaty exist.
First, it fails to rake into accounr immense Soviet ICBMl
SLBM reload capabilities (i .e., srraregic SNDV reserves).
Second, rhe lack of parity berween Soviet and U.S.
SNDVs was nor given consideration. The Soviet ICBM
force was far more lethal d1an irs U.S. counterpart, yet
born sides' ICBMs were counted equally. Lasr, me co~
cepr of "accounrable" warheads deployed on SNDVs. JS
Aawed. Photoreconnaissance suggests rhar me SovJet
SS-18 force, whjch represented most of me Soviet's !CB~
-L
· h adili·
u1row weight, was capable of being ourfitted wrr
tional warheads per missile in violation of rreary rerrns.

Strategic Defense Initiative
Because of chese criticisms, it has been argued chat che
START I T reary al lowed the Soviets to use the rubric of
arms reductions to ach ieve strategic offensive force moderniza tion while at che same time denying such an option
ro the United States. With che demise of che USSR and
the signing in Ja.nuary 1993 of the START II agreement
as yet unratified, many of chese criticisms may be al leviated. The START II treaty eliminates all MIRY-equipped
ICBMs and limits the overal l number of warheads to
3,500 or fewer.
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Strategic Defense Initiative
The Strategic D efe nse Initiative (SDI) was a research and
technology development program established by the
United States in January 1984. T he Strategic D efense Initiative O rgan ization (SDIO) was created in April 1984 to
explore five research concepts relating to a defense against
ballistic missiles. Two of these concepts were based primarily on forms of advanced non nuclear weaponry,
directed-energy weapons (DEW): lasers and particle
beam s, and kinetic energy weapons (KEW): electromagnetic and rail guns . The three other research concepts
were surveill ance, acquisition, tracking and kill assessment
(SATKA) , systems analysis and battle management (SN
BM), and survivability, lethality, and key technologies
(SLKT).
The Reagan admin istration's primary rationale behind
SDI was originally to protect the population of the
United Stares and char of its allies by a " missile shield";
however, che emphasis shifted to one of deterrence and
thereafter to lower Soviet capacity for preemptive strike
capab ility against U.S . retaliatory forces.
The USSR did not respond to che SOL Rather, the
SDI was a response by rhe United Stares to me strategic
missile defense program of the USSR. For years prior to
the SDI, the Soviets had been actively creating and deploying strategic missile defenses, at rimes in violation of
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tl1e 1972 Ami-Ballistic Missile (AB f) T reaty. Defenses
fo r che ovier capital, Moscow represented rhe only fu lly
operational ABM system deployed in cl1e world.
Soviet doctrine and strategy emp hasized rraregic defense as a complement to the use of overwhelming offensive forces. T he DI directly challenged Moscow' preemptive m ike capab ili ty and , as a re ult placed it nnre
military rrategy in jeopa rdy. Further, th DI threatened
to rake the Co ld War to a new rhre h ld and pl ace rhe
USSR in a no-wi n situatio n. A ballisri mis il e defen e
race wou ld place such an imm nse rrai n on the ov iet
econom ic and political sy rem rh ar ir woull be un able to
compere effectively aga inst a techn ologically adva nced
West unl ess ir adopted a marker eco nomy. T he adoptio n
of this type of econo mi c syste m would discred it and ul timately underm in e the ideology of the ovier Communist regime.
In res ponse, an in tensive propagand a and disinformarion cam paign was directed aga inst the DI by the
USSR. This well-coordinated ca mpaign was co nducted
on a number of levels, including overt governm ent arms
co nrrol efforrs, propaganda, and KG B-promoted active
measures cl1at focused o n the SDI.
The SDI program was reori ented in 199 1 under th e
Bush administratio n to defend aga inst lim ited ballistic
missile threats and became known as global protectio n
agai nst lim ited strikes (G PALS) . This program in rurn
was reorganized under the Ballistic Missile D efense Organization (BMDO) by the C lin ton administration. The
BMDO focused on theater mi ssile defense (TMD) and
contained very modest strategic ballistic missile defense
research .
The SDI was also known derogatorily as "s tar wars"
because of the scien ce fiction-like weaponry ir would require. T his type of weaponry, of which lasers are one
example, is currendy beginning to be deployed by U.S.
ground forces.
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